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neuronal aesthetics


neuronale_aesthetik 
Santiago Ramón y Cajal, Cerebralganglion of the sepia - longitudinal section of colored singles nerve cells 1917.


Seeing is not simply perceiving. Seeing is a process, where the perception, that which the sense organs mediate to the brain, is subject to the values given by the accounting architecture of this tissue [16,114]. Correspondingly a neuronal aesthetics describes the doctrine of experience starting out from the representation of the accounting peculiarities of the neuronal system itself [19]. Thus the search is not for a simple transfer of a description of the perceptual process of neuronal variables, but rather to follow the analysis and reconstitution of the limitations and the chances of an internal encoding process of possible sensory processings [35, 36, 103]. Perceptions are consequently described from the conditions and according to the peculiarity of the neuronally mediated internal representation of world states. Such a newly acquired experiential theory does not reduce itself to a simplified if need be only a sociobiological underpinned neuroaesthetics [102, 105]. Rather, it attempts a new conception of the representation of the world through the formal rules of neuronal accounting. Of interest are the principle moments of such an objective, and how they are introduced in model assumptions for a better understanding of perceptual proceedings and in alternative programmings for evolutionary robotics [28, 75]. The starting point for a corresponding account is presented by the leading MORPHO-LOGIC, which simplifies the discursiveness of world descriptions and values the state of perceptions not according to pre-given filter functions, but via a differential calculus of experiential states. Gestalt signifies the combined and the characteristic of an aggregate of patterns. In this characteristic because of the similarity criteria they can be assigned to each other. Already two individuals of a type reveal striking variations in their gestalt - we only need to think of different cat breeds. Thereby systematic grids can be found, according to morphological criteria, that undoubtedly enable us to differentiate feline and canine carnivores as two distinct groups of organisms from each other. Highly convincing for such a delimitation are not single characteristic features [32, 107]. It is the relational characteristics by which a singularities is to be characterized allowing a new access towards a description and evaluation of species characteristics and evolutionary novelties, in particular [108, 111].

Such a neuronal aesthetic will be extended to a general function of morphological frame, describing the potential of a non-sequential, pre-categorial characterization of qualifications, interactions and intersections [38]. Thus, the new way of thinking of a "neuronal aesthetic" historically brings out the complexity of the investigations on the "form" and will allow us to capture the difficulty of the parallelism of different evolutionary perspectives, estimations and manifestations. D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson attempted to capture mathematically the corresponding form peculiarities, however in the most decisive step of his argumentation he remained purely visual [106]. Thompson demonstrated how through simple deformation of the body-form of the organism X it could be transferred into the body-form of organism Y [15, 113]. The consequences of this situation currently show themselves as a biological morphology, that 'Gestalt' from now on grasps as a result of a developmental process and accordingly seeks to define 'Gestalt' via the mechanism that makes this ontogenetic process conceivable [53, 64] Thus the formation processes are not understood as mathematical laws but as real determinations of ontogenesis processes, that can only be analytically described through the medium of molecular genetic methods [1, 87, 91]. Morphology is reduced to a developmental genetics, but which in turn - and here the circularity of any corresponding approach becomes clear - presupposes once again a structural concept [17, 92]. In this respect and under these preconditions the concept of form does not allow itself to be replaced through a representation of the gestalt or form building process. An alternative analytically broader concept of form is at present not yet formulated. The general approach that the French mathematician, René Thom conceived [100], is too abstract for a classification of real data sets. The possible entitlement towards such a concept however- and here Thom formulated a far-reaching approach- does not exist alone in a classification of static patterns, but rather in the classification of dynamically changing types [101]. Classicial morphology compares profiles in which the structures in their relative determinations to one another; morphology describes processes and regards the profile only as a moment of a dynamic in which it is itself weighted and related to each other. So morphologic does not simply outline a proto-logic, but operates with a determinacy of possibilities, which in their potential sequential relatedness can be described and evaluated. Insofar morphologic operates with a reference to dispositivs [86], constituting relational framework potential references, that determine a space, of at first object free intuitions as dispositions of our experience [19]. It is evident that a relational characteristic of a whole, in the process of being constituted, can only be grasped precisely in its determinations and only in the reconstruction of this process.


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